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EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
THE MARSHALL COURT: A REREADING OF
LITTLE V. BARREME AND MURRAY V. SCHOONER
CHARMING BETSY
Jane Manners*
This Essay uses two 1804 opinions by Chief Justice John Marshall to
explicate a world in which understandings of executive power and the rule
of law were very different from those that predominate today. Scholars have
misread Little v. Barreme and Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, this
Essay argues, because they apply modern assumptions about the balance of
power between Congress and the executive that do not fit the Marshall
Court’s constitutional vision. Contemporary interpretations read Little for
the propositions that the president’s inherent wartime power may be limited
by statute and that early American jurists rejected officers’ “good faith”
defenses to liability for tortious acts. But the opinion in fact reflects the
Marshall Court’s view that, in an undeclared war, the president could not
act at all unless authorized by Congress and that under no circumstances
could the president give an officer a right to act where Congress had not.
Charming Betsy, meanwhile, is known today for the “Charming Betsy
canon”: Marshall’s assertion that wherever possible, courts ought to
interpret the laws of Congress to accord with international law. In its
historical context, however, the case illustrates Marshall’s view of the law of
nations not as an external constraint on sovereignty—a common
understanding of international law’s role today—but as an aspect of the rule
of law critical to preserving the proper allocation of powers between
Congress and the president. Indeed, read together, these cases show
Marshall using the law of nations to reinforce a tenet central to the
separation of powers in the new republic: that only Congress could alter the
nation’s war footing. Through Little and Charming Betsy, the Marshall
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Court sought to foreclose Congress’s efforts to abdicate its responsibility to
authorize acts of war and thus to underscore the constitutional balance that
placed the warmaking and lawmaking power not with the courts, not with the
executive, but with Congress.
INTRODUCTION
To admiring scholars of Chief Justice John Marshall, 1803’s Marbury v.
Madison1 opinion represents a crowning achievement:
a strategic
masterpiece of statutory interpretation that avoided a partisan, interbranch
conflict over executive authority, while at the same time establishing the
judiciary’s power to review a statute’s constitutionality. In the prevailing
view, the decision was intensely political: Marshall the Federalist, knowing
he could not compel his personal and political rival, President Thomas
Jefferson, to comply with the Court’s holding, chose instead to declare in
dicta that Marbury had a right to his commission, while at the same time
preserving the U.S. Supreme Court’s fragile authority by holding that it
lacked the jurisdiction to hear such cases and thus could not provide a
remedy. Scholars have emphasized the holding’s significance for the
judiciary’s oversight of administrative action and for its “structural
approach” to judicial review.2 There is disagreement on whether and to what
extent Marshall engineered the conflict between Article III and section 13 of
the Judiciary Act of 17893 to tee up a holding on judicial review.4 But there
is widespread consensus that the opinion showcased Marshall’s deft
maneuvering in a treacherous political climate and, in establishing judicial
review,5 provided critical clarity to one aspect of the otherwise indeterminate
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455,
561–62 (2005) (describing Marbury as rooted in “the constitutional theory” that “protection
of spheres of governmental authority was critical to the rule of law and the protection of
individual liberty”); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1983).
3. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
4. Compare, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’
CONSTITUTION 75 (1988) (describing Marbury as a “flagrant specimen[] of judicial activism”),
Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 455–56 (1989), and Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John
Marshall’s Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 301, 328–29,
with James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory
Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1518 (2001) (arguing Marbury is “a good deal closer” to
Marshall’s contemporaries’ understanding of the Court’s authority than most modern
commentators assume).
5. More recent scholarship suggests that judicial review was relatively well established
by 1803. Compare, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962), and SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990), with Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the
“Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1113–14 (2001), Maeva Marcus,
Judicial Review in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE “EXTENDED REPUBLIC”: THE
FEDERALIST ERA 204 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1997), and Treanor, supra note
2, at 561 (contextualizing Marbury within the then “common practice of invalidating statutes
that affected the judiciary”).
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boundaries between the branches of the infant federal government.6 Perhaps
most important, Marshall’s pronouncement that the United States possessed
a “government of laws, and not of men”7 helped to cement a central tenet of
the Federalist Constitution that appeared endangered by Jeffersonians’
resounding recent victory at the polls and what one scholar has characterized
as their commitment to “a politics of revolution.”8
Little v. Barreme9 and Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,10 two
Marshall opinions issued a year after Marbury,11 each involving erroneous
seizures of neutral vessels during the United States’s Quasi-War with France,
have not received anything like the painstaking analysis that scholars have
devoted to Marbury. Today, Little is known for two holdings. The first
concerns whether a federal statute can “disable” the president’s inherent
authority to determine the manner in which the country wages war.12 The
second relates to what today falls under the label of qualified immunity:
whether an officer who commits a tort in the course of following orders in
good faith can be excused from damages. Scholars have cited the case as
evidence that war was not always regarded as a preserve of the executive

6. For the indeterminacy of the concept of separation of powers at the founding, see
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1730 (1996) (refuting
“the idea that the Founders had developed a thoroughgoing, tripartite baseline capable of
resolving modern controversies”); John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944 (2011) (noting that “[t]he historical record . . .
reveals no one baseline for inferring what a reasonable constitutionmaker would have
understood ‘the separation of powers’ to mean in the abstract”).
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
8. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICA 10 (1997); see also GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JACKSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–1815, at 202 (1981) (describing Marshall’s “concern for a
reconciliation between transcendent popular will, as exhibited in the legislature, and
immutable principles of law, as embodied in ‘a regular administration of justice’” (quoting 5
JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 100–02 (Philadelphia, C. P. Wayne
1807)); GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY,
EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S, at 89 (2019)
(describing Marshall as “fear[ing] the consequences of the Republican ascendancy for
Federalist legalism”).
9. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
10. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
11. Little was first argued in December 1801, the same month as Marbury. It was
reargued in February 1803, the same month that the Court both heard arguments in Charming
Betsy and issued its decision in Marbury.
12. Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander in Chief, and the Separation of Powers
After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 939 (2007).
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branch13 and of the harshness of the law of official immunity in the founding
era.14
Although scholars correctly recognize in Little a vision of executive power
more limited than that which predominates today, they misread the case in
certain crucial respects and therefore miss both Marshall’s strategic agility
and the Marbury-like separation of powers principle that lies at its heart. The
more accurate reading of the case, I argue, reveals a far stronger precedent
for congressional control over the conduct of hostilities. Little does not stand
for the idea that the president’s constitutional war power is constrained only
by explicit statutory limits. Instead, it represents the widespread foundingera understanding that in an undeclared war, the president’s authority to
engage in hostilities derives exclusively from statute.15 Read in light of the
Justices’ ongoing disagreement over judicial cognizance of executive orders,
captured in footnotes in the original edition of the U.S. Reports, Little
reminds us that the Marshall Court’s rejection of official immunity reflected
its conviction that the Constitution placed the lawmaking and warmaking
13. See, e.g., DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 66 (2016); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander
in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding (pt.
1), 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 762 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb I]
(arguing that, in Little, “a statute had prohibited the President from using the navy during an
armed conflict in a manner that might otherwise have been within his constitutionally
authorized discretion”); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb—a Constitutional History (pt. 2), 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 968 (2008)
[hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb II] (citing Little for the proposition that
Congress’s authorization of the use of force in an undeclared war “implied statutory
limitations on the Commander in Chief’s war powers that must be followed”); Michael J.
Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or CurtissWright?, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5, 11 (1988) (arguing that Little views the president’s foreign
affairs power as “largely dependent upon the will of Congress”); Harold Hongju Koh, Setting
the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2366–67, 2367 n.67 (2006) (placing Little in a line of
decisions “rejecting the claim that the President may invoke his power as Commander in Chief
to disregard an act of Congress designed specifically to restrain executive conduct in a
particular field”); Henry J. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 24 (1993) (arguing that, under Little, “the President lacks authority to act contra legem,
even in an emergency”); Vladeck, supra note 12, at 935 (attributing to Little a conception of
the separation of war powers in which “the President could not disregard valid substantive
limitations that Congress placed upon his authority during wartime”). But see J. Gregory
Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether “Letters of Marque and
Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 492 (2005)
(ascribing to Little, by “negative implication,” a capacious view of wartime executive
authority in instances of congressional silence).
14. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 55
(2018); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs,
44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14 (1972); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional
Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 942–43 (2019) (citing Little as an example of the founding-era
common law’s “striking[]” relative disregard for government officials’ responsibilities); Ann
Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
396, 415 (1987). But cf. James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1862, 1864, 1865 n.11 (2010) (noting that Marshall acknowledged “the harshness of the
rule” but also that Congress indemnified Little three years later).
15. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
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authority with Congress alone.16 Executive orders could not immunize an
officer against damages because only Congress could “give a right.”17 This
precept, in turn, was intimately connected with the principle that only
Congress could alter the nation’s war footing, and thus only Congress could
decide when to deviate from the law of nations’ rules for peacetime conduct.
This vision of the power of the legislature in relation to the other branches
was, I argue, central to the Court’s understanding of the rule of law, no less
than (and indeed, intimately connected to) the idea that the federal
government was “a government of laws, and not of men.”18
Scholars have likewise missed the constitutional stakes of Charming
Betsy, a Marshall opinion issued five days before Little. Like Little,
Charming Betsy involved a U.S. naval officer’s mistaken seizure of a neutral
vessel. Today, the case is known for the “Charming Betsy canon,” instructing
courts to interpret the laws of Congress to accord with international law
whenever possible.19 Yet when it was decided, the case was better known
for its holding that probable cause was the standard of proof for seizures of
neutral vessels on the high seas.20 Marshall’s interjections during oral
16. See id. at 177–78.
17. See id. at 179 (“[T]he instructions of the executive could not give a right . . . .”).
18. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
19. The literature on the Charming Betsy canon, its present-day significance, and the case
underlying it is substantial. See, e.g., ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE
LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 235 (2017) (arguing that the canon
“presuppose[s] that Congress could violate the law of nations if it clearly expressed its intent
to do so”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2018) (arguing that, as the executive claims increasing
control over international law matters, courts applying the Charming Betsy canon “often give
presidential interpretations of international law substantial deference”); Curtis A. Bradley, The
Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of
International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 484 (1998) (arguing that contemporary use of the canon
is best justified as a heuristic to preserve separation of powers); David M. Golove & Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, The Law of Nations and the Constitution: An Early Modern Perspective, 106
GEO. L.J. 1593, 1655–56 (2018) (reviewing Professors Anothony J. Bellia and Bradford R.
Clark’s book and refuting the idea that the canon presupposes Congress’s authority to violate
the law of nations); Frederick C. Leiner, The Charming Betsy and the Marshall Court, 45 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1 (2001); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1196 (1990) (arguing that the canon
encourages “a mode of inclusive analysis, admitting multiple sources of potentially relevant
considerations into a process of practical reasoning”); Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in
the Age of Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 267 (1993) (cautioning against the
antidemocratic effects of courts’ reliance on the canon).
20. See, e.g., Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458, 483 (1806) (showing counsel for
appellee arguing that “[u]nless the taking was lawful, or with probable cause, the captor is
liable for all the loss” and unfavorably comparing Maley’s case to Murray’s); id. at 489
(including Marshall listing evidence supporting probable cause in Charming Betsy to reach
the same conclusion); Burke v. Trevitt, 4 F. Cas. 746, 748 n.4 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 2163)
(Story, J.) (citing, among others, Charming Betsy, Little, and Maley to demonstrate the
unsettled nature of the question whether probable cause excused an officer from damages
where the officer erroneously seized goods for a suspected violation of a municipal statute and
whether there was a difference between seizures on land and on the high seas); The Rover, 20
F. Cas. 1277, 1278 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 12,091) (Story, J.) (showing respondents’
counsel citing Charming Betsy, Little, and Maley for the proposition that probable cause
justified the seizure of an American vessel suspected of violating a trade prohibition, the law’s
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argument reveal his concern that the executive order under which Captain
Alexander Murray had seized The Charming Betsy, in instructing officers to
seize vessels “apparently, as well as really American,” had exceeded the
authority granted by Congress and violated the law of nations, thereby
moving the nation closer to war.21 At risk were both the United States’s
precarious standing as a civilized nation22—had the United States
deliberately violated neutral rights?—and the fundamental constitutional
division of power in which Congress alone possessed the ability to alter the
nation’s war footing. Ultimately, Marshall’s worry led him to find a way to
reconcile the order’s “probable cause” standard with the law of nations.23 By
creatively interpreting the bounds of the president’s statutorily granted
authority, I argue, Marshall preserved the essential constitutional balance that
placed the lawmaking and warmaking power with Congress.
Little and Charming Betsy thus round out our understanding of what
Marshall meant when he pronounced in Marbury that the United States
government was a government of laws, not of men. In the face of
Jeffersonians’ provocations, Marshall used his opinions to delineate what it
meant for a government to be premised on the rule of law. To be sure, there
are important differences between the political stakes of the three opinions,
including the fact that the presidential administration on the hot seat in Little
and Charming Betsy was that of President John Adams, not President
Jefferson. Yet, like scholars who resist a deeply politicized interpretation of
Marbury,24 I do not believe that Marshall’s upholding of the executive orders
at issue in Little and Charming Betsy was nakedly partisan. 25 Instead, the
three opinions together shed light on the constitutional vision of one of the
early republic’s foremost legal practitioners—a vision centered not only on
municipal status notwithstanding, and for the sufficiency of the evidence); The Lively, 15 F.
Cas. 631, 633–34 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 8403) (citing Charming Betsy’s probable cause
holding). Of course, Charming Betsy was cited for its other holdings as well. See, e.g., The
Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 257 (1814) (citing Charming Betsy’s holding regarding
expatriation); Maley, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 484, 491 (citing Charming Betsy’s holdings
regarding the sale of American-made vessels to neutrals and damages).
21. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 78 (1804) (emphasis
omitted).
22. For an illuminating discussion of the Framers’ focus on the urgency of the United
States’s compliance with the law of nations, see David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A
Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of
International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010).
23. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of
Constitutional Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2003); Pfander, supra note 4, at 1522;
Treanor, supra note 2.
25. The partisan upshot of the opinions is far from clear. The finding that Adams’s orders
had been lawful, although resting on a creative interpretation of what the law of nations
allowed, was not fanciful. The opinions precluded congressional attempts to avoid the
political and electoral consequences of an ambiguous and ambivalent approach to war, shoring
up a key separation of powers principle (that the power to make war rested with Congress)
that lacked an obvious partisan valence. And while the opinions’ major premise—that only
Congress could give a right—arguably limited Jefferson’s power, it did so by empowering the
heavily Jeffersonian legislature.
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the idea that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy,” 26 but
also on the understanding that Congress, not the executive, possessed the
power to give rights and start wars and could not evade the accountability
that came with it. 27
Because the cases themselves are complex and involve nonobvious
questions of international law, and because one of my aims is to showcase
the game of three-dimensional chess that Marshall played to resolve the
dilemmas they presented, the remainder of this Essay proceeds by
reconstructing Marshall’s reasoning from the inside out. It begins, in Part I,
by describing the decisions’ Quasi-War context and the facts of Little before
foregrounding a puzzle in Marshall’s Little opinion: what had his brethren
said to change his mind regarding Captain George Little’s immunity? Part
II turns to Charming Betsy for an answer, describing the facts of the case and
taking a scene-setting detour through the centrality of the probable cause
dilemma that Marshall confronted in both cases: if the law that had
authorized the orders under which both Captains Little and Murray had acted
had not been a war measure, did that mean that the executive, in ordering the
seizure of vessels “apparently, as well as really American,” had exceeded the
authority Congress had delegated to him? The law-of-nations rule was that
only in a state of war could a nation seize neutral vessels on the high seas
with probable cause to believe that the vessels were in some way aiding the
enemy. Outside of war, officers seized vessels suspected of violating the law
at their own risk and faced strict liability for damages incurred if their
suspicions proved unfounded. If the president’s order could not be squared
with the law of nations, the unavoidable implication was that he had moved
the nation closer to a war footing than Congress had authorized, something
that not even the most strident advocates of the president’s commander-inchief powers believed he could do.
To shed light on this pivotal question, Captain Murray’s counsel offered
to read the president’s orders themselves, but Justice Samuel Chase cut him
off, explaining that it was “a bad practice” to read executive orders in court
and that he would always “give [his] voice” against it.28 Part II proceeds to
describe the rule of law principle that likely motivated Chase’s vehement
objections and perhaps Marshall’s change of heart regarding Captain Little’s
immunity as well: the idea that the dispensing power—literally, the
executive’s power to dispense with the law in particular circumstances for
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
27. In many ways, Marshall’s constitutional vision resembles the one that John Phillip
Reid ascribes to the American Whigs whose heavily legalistic arguments led their country to
revolution against Britain. As described by Reid, this vision rejected contemporary Britons’
embrace of parliamentary supremacy—a vision in which “legislation was command, the fist
of power and the voice of sovereignty”—and instead conceived “of government not so much
in terms of sovereignty and command but somewhat optimistically as the rule of law.” 4 JOHN
PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW 4–5 (1993). It was this constitutional theory that appeared under threat in the high tide
of Jeffersonian popularity, and it was this vision that Marshall was attempting to protect not
only in Marbury but in Little and Charming Betsy as well.
28. See infra Part II.B.
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particular people—had no place in a government premised on the rule of law.
It was this principle that made the problem of probable cause such a concern,
for if Congress had not authorized the seizure of neutral vessels on probable
cause, then the executive certainly could not; to hold otherwise would be to
reject the constitutional vision in which the dispensing power was antithetical
to lawful rule. Drawing on this insight, Part II then explains how Marshall
solved the problem of probable cause in Charming Betsy without running
afoul of this critical rule of law principle, clearing the path for the Court’s
decision in Little. Part III explores the implications of this backstory for the
standard readings of Little’s holdings. Far from assuming a deep reservoir
of presidential war power bottomed only by statutory limits, Little starts from
the premise that the Non-Intercourse Act29 had impliedly authorized the
president to issue implementing orders and thus that the president’s power
stemmed from statute. By starting from the wrong premise, I show, the
standard characterization of Little’s holding as one in which the president’s
inherent war power is in conflict with statute misses key assumptions about
the limits of executive power that undergird the decision. Rather than
centering on Congress’s ability to limit executive war power, Little turns on
the rule of law principle that “the executive could not give a right.” The
Conclusion then suggests this Essay’s doctrinal, methodological, and
historiographical implications.
At its core, this Essay makes two interrelated points. The first is historical
and doctrinal: the holdings of Little and Charming Betsy are products and
evidence of a constitutional vision in which a profoundly constrained
executive was central to the rule of law and in which the law of nations was
the law of the land. The second is methodological, with implications that go
far beyond the particular holdings of two 1804 cases. Scholars have misread
these opinions, it argues, because they have missed this wider constitutional
vision. Excavating this vision through close doctrinal analysis, paying
attention to original edition footnotes and overlooked, deliberate turns of
phrase, does more than suggest that contemporary arguments for expansive
presidential war power do not stand on originalist legs. It also underscores
the extent to which our world, where military engagements are frequently
fought without any legislative authorization at all, diverges from the state of
the republic during America’s first undeclared war. In John Marshall’s
United States, it was a fundamental constitutional precept that the president
could not unilaterally alter the “existing state of things” by bringing the
nation any closer to war than Congress had authorized. As James Madison
put it in a 1798 letter to Thomas Jefferson, “[t]he constitution supposes, what
the History of all Govts. demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power
most interested in war, & most prone to it,” and consequently had “vested
the question of war in the Legisl.”30 Marshall’s deft maneuvering in both
Little and Charming Betsy demonstrates his effort to apply this fundamental
29. Ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613 (1799).
30. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 17 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 104, 104 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1991).
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understanding in the murky context of the Quasi-War. Yet the separation of
powers in our modern arrangement has veered so far from this premise that
contemporary scholars have failed to recognize its centrality to both
opinions, as well as to Marshall’s larger constitutional frame.
Undoubtedly, the world of 2021 is not the world of 1798 or 1804. Yet the
concerns that animated James Madison in 1798 and John Marshall in 1804
are, if anything, more pressing today. Recovering this lost constitutional
order invites us to consider the applicability of its precepts to our modern
arrangements, asking both how we have come so far from the Federalist
constitutional vision and whether that vision might, even in today’s changed
world, offer salutary lessons.
I. THE QUASI-WAR WITH FRANCE, THE NON-INTERCOURSE ACTS, AND
THE MYSTERY OF MARSHALL’S CHANGE OF MIND
The conflict that gave rise to both Little and Charming Betsy was the
United States’s Quasi-War with France. France, resentful of the United
States’s 1794 Jay Treaty with Great Britain and upset by what it saw as
America’s deviations from its earlier commitments to the French, began to
harass American commercial vessels in the mid-1790s.31 After diplomatic
efforts failed (future Chief Justice Marshall, then a member of Congress, had
been one of three American envoys who had spent the winter of 1797–1798
in Paris attempting unsuccessfully to negotiate with three anonymous French
ministers in what became known as the XYZ Affair),32 Congress responded
with a series of warlike measures beginning in the spring of 1798,33 each
authorizing the president to protect American commerce without a formal
declaration of war.
The divisions in Congress over these measures were sharply partisan:
Federalists, who were in the majority, wanted a formal declaration of war,
while minority Republicans mostly aimed to pass only defensive measures.34
Federalists and Republicans also disagreed regarding the extent to which
Congress could control the president’s deployment of congressionally
authorized forces. Federalists believed, as Speaker of the House Jonathan
Dayton argued in 1798, that the president’s role was to use “the military and
naval force . . . as should appear to be most likely to promote the general
welfare, having regard to the existing state of things, whether of peace or

31. For more on the Quasi-War context, see generally GARDNER W. ALLEN, OUR NAVAL
WAR WITH FRANCE (1909); ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801 (1966); FREDERICK C.
LEINER, MILLIONS FOR DEFENSE: THE SUBSCRIPTION WAR SHIPS OF 1798 (2000); MICHAEL A.
PALMER, STODDERT’S WAR: NAVAL OPERATIONS DURING THE QUASI-WAR WITH FRANCE,
1798–1801 (1987); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976).
32. See ALLEN, supra note 31, at 23–26.
33. See id. at 39.
34. See DECONDE, supra note 31, at 89–92.
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war.”35 To Dayton and his like-minded colleagues, the president’s role as
commander in chief involved broad discretion to control authorized armed or
naval forces, so long as he did not alter the “existing state of things, whether
of peace or war,” as determined by Congress. The Republicans’ position, in
contrast, was that Congress retained significant control over any force that
had been raised. “When a force was raised for a particular object,” agreed
Republican House member John Nicholas,
it was [the president’s] business to direct the manner in which this force
should be used; but to say that he had the right to apply it at his discretion,
was to make him master of the United States . . . . If a contrary doctrine
were to prevail, if [Congress] did not give up the right of declaring war,
they gave up the power, which would inevitably lead to war.36

Federalists and Republicans nonetheless agreed in some respects. Among
these was the understanding, as Abraham Sofaer has written, that “the power
to take military actions that significantly increase the risk of war must be
clearly delegated”37 and that the president “could not alter the existing state
of things” by moving the country from peace to war, a position to which even
the zealous Dayton subscribed.38 Many Federalists and Republicans also
agreed that in the absence of legislative direction, the president’s actions
were governed by the law of nations.39 What this meant in practice—
whether, for instance, the president could engage in a defensive action
consistent with international law that nevertheless moved the country closer
to war—was far less clear. The ambiguity may have been deliberate: while
some members of Congress likely believed the president ought to possess
such discretion, others were probably happy to avoid the responsibility
themselves by creating a situation in which the president would be to blame
if his orders brought the nation from peace to war.40
35. SOFAER, supra note 31, at 151 (quoting 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1454–55 (1798)
(statement of Rep. Jonathan Dayton)).
36. SOFAER, supra note 31, at 149 (quoting 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 362 (1797) (statement of
Rep. John Nicholas)).
37. Id. at 157.
38. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1445 (1798). After Congress had approved the outfitting of
additional armed vessels in April 1798, Dayton argued against legislative language
authorizing the president to use these vessels “in any . . . manner which, in his judgment, will
best contribute to the interests of the United States.” He thought that this clause undermined
the president’s power by providing congressional authorization where none was needed. The
president, he argued, “as Commander in Chief, could employ [the force] as he thought proper,”
provided that he did so with “regard to the existing state of things, whether of peace or war.”
Id. at 1445, 1455. Federalist Robert Goodloe Harper agreed, stating that while the president
“could not alter the existing state of things,” thereby forcing a “state of war” on a state “at
peace,” once force was authorized, it was up to the president to determine the manner in which
it “should be employed, conformably to the state of peace and the rights and duties resulting
from it.” Id. at 1445–46. That even these champions of presidential war power believed the
president could not alter the “existing state of things” underscores how uncontroversial this
position was in the early republic. For more on the significance of this understanding for
Marshall’s opinion in Little, see infra Part III.
39. SOFAER, supra note 31, at 154.
40. See id.; see also infra Part III. The problem of Congress’s abdication of its
responsibility to authorize acts of war was a singular focus of separation of powers scholarship
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As Congress was taking steps to protect American commerce without a
formal declaration of war, it passed a series of Non-Intercourse Acts—
officially, acts “to suspend the Commercial Intercourse between the United
States and France, and the dependencies thereof.”41 The first passed in June
of 1798, followed by a second in February 1799, and a third in February
1800, forbidding and penalizing all trade between the United States and
France.42 The 1798 statute impliedly left the work of seizure and
condemnation up to the nation’s private armed vessels, while the 1799 and
1800 measures added a section explicitly authorizing the president to instruct
public armed vessels to stop and examine American vessels suspected of
violating the prohibition and to seize and send in for adjudication any ship
apparently in violation of the Act.43 After the 1799 and 1800 NonIntercourse Acts, at the request of President Adams, Secretary of the Navy
Benjamin Stoddert instructed naval commanders to seize vessels on “just
suspicion” of violating the Act, to “prevent all [French-American]
intercourse . . . in cases where the vessels or cargoes are apparently, as well
as really, American,” and to take special care that “vessels or cargoes really
American, but covered by Danish or other foreign papers, and bound to, or
from, French Ports, do not escape you.”44 It was on these orders that
Captains Little and Murray, in 1799 and 1800, respectively, mistakenly
seized Danish ships.
Of the two cases, Little was the first to reach the Supreme Court. Marshall
and his fellow Justices heard argument in the case in December 1801.45 In
December 1799, Captain Little, following Stoddert’s orders, had captured
The Flying Fish, a Danish ship sailing from Jeremie, a French port in
Hispaniola, to St. Thomas, a Danish colony. Little had suspected The Flying
Fish was really American, and he returned it to Boston for trial. The
Massachusetts district court discovered that he had gotten the facts wrong:
the vessel really was Danish. The circuit court, hearing the case on appeal,
found he had gotten the law wrong too. True, The Flying Fish had been
sailing from a French port, but it was not sailing to one, and the language of
section 5 of the 1799 statute—“if, upon examination, it shall appear that such

for much of the second half of the twentieth century. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
41. Act of June 13, 1798, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565.
42. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 77 (1804).
43. Compare § 1, 1 Stat. at 565 (providing that vessels violating the prohibition “shall be
forfeited, and shall accrue, the one half to the use of the United States, and the other half to
the use of any person or persons, citizens of the United States, who will inform and prosecute
for the same”), with Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 613, and Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10,
§ 8, 1 Stat 7, 10 (authorizing the president to instruct naval officers to seize vessels that
appeared to be violating the prohibition).
44. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 171–72 (1804); see also H.R. REP. NO. 8-44
(1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 128, 132 (Washington,
Gales & Seaton 1834) (reporting the Committee of Claims’s recommendation that Alexander
Murray’s petition be granted). Throughout this Essay, I refer interchangeably to the orders as
issuing from Stoddert or from Adams.
45. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 176.
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ship or vessel is bound or sailing to any port or place within the territory of
the French Republic”46—covered only the latter circumstance.
The Supreme Court did not issue its ruling in the case right away. Instead,
it waited over two years, hearing reargument in February 1804 and issuing
its ruling on February 27, less than a week after announcing its opinion in
Charming Betsy. The record does not reveal the cause of the delay.47 But
Justice Marshall, in his Little opinion, admitted he was troubled by the idea
that a military officer would owe damages for an act he had been ordered to
take. “I was strongly inclined to think,” Marshall wrote, that “the claim of
the injured party for damages would be against that government from which
the orders proceeded, and would be a proper subject for negotiation.”48 Yes,
section 5 of the 1799 Non-Intercourse Act had spoken only of vessels sailing
to French ports, but Secretary Stoddert had instructed naval commanders not
to let American vessels bound “to or from French Ports” escape; how was it
fair for Little to pay the price for Stoddert’s mistake? Perhaps, Marshall
thought, the fact that Little had been following executive instructions could
“excuse an act not otherwise excusable.”49 If that were so, Little might
escape damages altogether, if the Court then found that he had had probable
cause for believing the vessel to be American.50 Marshall was initially “in
favor of the opinion that though the instructions of the executive could not
give a right, they might yet excuse from damages,”51 implicitly transferring
the responsibility to remedy the resulting harm from the individual officer to
the sovereign, to be pursued through diplomatic means.52 He had thought
that the military chain of command implied “the principle that [military]
orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the person whose
general duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by the laws of his country
in a situation which in general requires that he should obey them.”53 But
Marshall “[had] been convinced” that he was wrong.54 “I acquiesce in [the
46. § 5, 1 Stat. at 615.
47. In 1802, the new Jeffersonian Congress adjusted the Court’s terms so that it did not
sit at all that year, perhaps because it feared the Court would find its repeal of the Judiciary
Act of 1801 unconstitutional. See R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
MARSHALL AND TANEY 28 (1968); see also HASKINS & JACKSON, supra note 8, at 184. This
explains some (but not all) of the delay. See Vladeck, supra note 12, at 942 n.55 (noting Little
was the only case argued in December 1801 not decided that term and that it was not decided
during the February 1803 sitting either).
48. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179.
49. Id. at 178.
50. Id. at 178–79.
51. Id. at 179.
52. Secretary of State James Madison and Denmark’s consul and resident minister
Richard Söderström corresponded over several Danish reparation claims arising from the
Quasi-War. Madison maintained that Congress would consider compensating the Danish
captains only after the courts denied relief and only if “the obligations of the United States
should be found nevertheless to demand that compensation should be made.” Pfander & Hunt,
supra note 14, at 1895 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Richard Söderström (July 23,
1801), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: SECRETARY OF STATE SERIES 461 (Robert J.
Brugger et al. eds. 1986)).
53. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179.
54. Id.
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opinion] of my brethren,” he explained, “which is, that the instructions
cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which, without
those instructions, would have been a plain trespass.”55 It was “therefore
unnecessary to inquire” into probable cause, because even if The Flying Fish
had “actually been an American, the seizure would [still] have been
unlawful.”56 Little was liable; the Court affirmed the lower court judgment
with costs.57
What his brethren said to convince him, Marshall does not say. But
William Cranch, the court reporter, recorded in his footnotes an exchange
among the Justices during the February 1804 arguments in Charming Betsy
that offers some insight.58 The debate reveals that Little was not the first case
in which the Marshall Court had wrestled with the relevance of executive
orders to a party’s liability. Whether a president, acting out of military
necessity, could legalize an unlawful act hinged on an issue that went to the
heart of what it meant to be a government of laws, not men: what, exactly,
were the sources of law-giving authority in the new republic?
II. THE CHARMING BETSY AND THE PROBLEM OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN A
PARTIAL WAR
In June of 1800, U.S. naval captain Alexander Murray seized from French
captors a schooner called The Charming Betsy and sold her cargo in
Martinique. That December, he libeled her in a Philadelphia district court.59
In his libel, Murray explained that he had seized the schooner on the belief
that she was an American vessel sailing to Guadeloupe, a French colony, in
violation of the 1800 Non-Intercourse Act.60 But the Philadelphia district
court found that The Charming Betsy in fact belonged to a Danish subject
named Jared Shattuck. Whether Murray had had probable cause to believe
the schooner was American was irrelevant, Judge Richard Peters held,
because probable cause could not excuse him from damages. Peters ordered
the vessel restored to Shattuck with costs and damages.61 On appeal, the
circuit court affirmed the restitution and payment of net proceeds of the sale

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. These footnotes were edited out in subsequent editions. See Craig Joyce, The Rise of
the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1291 (1985). One of this Essay’s methodological claims is that the footnotes,
oral arguments, and lower court opinions included in the original edition of the U.S. Reports
illuminate important aspects of the Court’s decisions and dynamics.
59. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 66–69 (1804).
60. Ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7 (1800); see Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 65.
61. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 69–70. In admiralty, unlike at common law, a
captor whose seizure was found to be illegal was immediately liable to a decree for damages.
See id. at 73 (argument of counsel) (citing The “Fabius” (1800) 165 Eng. Rep. 304, 2 C Rob.
245 (Eng.), which affirmed a ruling revoking a lower court’s sentence of confiscation and
decreed restitution and damages).
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of the cargo but reversed for the residue; both parties appealed to the Supreme
Court.62
Alexander Dallas, the U.S. attorney general representing Murray on
appeal,63 knew the key to excusing Murray from damages was to convince
the Justices that Murray’s liability turned on whether he had had probable
cause to seize The Charming Betsy. This, Dallas knew, hinged on war. Not
only had Dallas been the court reporter in 1788’s Respublica v. Sparhawk,64
where Congress’s wartime powers were held to justify an act that would
ordinarily have been a trespass,65 but he had also argued the losing side in
1801’s Talbot v. Seeman,66 where Marshall held that it was “a universal
principle” that where war was involved, it was “lawful” to capture vessels at
sea and subject them to court adjudication, so long as there was probable
cause to believe the vessel “liable to capture.”67 If Murray’s seizure of The
Charming Betsy could be deemed an act taken pursuant to the United States’s
war effort, then he would be liable only if he had lacked probable cause for
the seizure. It was in this context that Dallas offered to read the president’s
order as evidence of the “nature of the case,” only to be sharply rebuffed by
Justice Chase.68 To shed light on Chase’s response and its implications, this
Essay will turn briefly to the law-of-nations principle under debate: whether
probable cause could be understood to govern the seizure of neutrals outside
of wartime.
A. The Notice Problem
The reason that probable cause hinged on war was a question of notice. A
sovereign, Emmerich de Vattel had explained in his eighteenth-century
treatise on the law of nations, “is to make known his declaration of war to the
neutral powers . . . to notify them that such or such a nation is his enemy, that
they may conduct themselves accordingly.”69 Neutral nations could be
expected to take notice of declared wars and to anticipate that belligerents
would seize, on the high seas, apparently neutral vessels that they suspected
62. Id. at 70. Judge Peters was no admiralty novice. A few years earlier, he had
spearheaded a rare American printing of a six-volume edition of Sir William Scott’s admiralty
judgments. See John D. Gordan III, Publishing Robinson’s Reports of Cases Argued and
Determined in the High Court of Admiralty, 32 LAW & HIST. REV. 525, 528, 544 (2014).
Peters had received the original copy of the second volume of Robinson’s Reports, which he
used as the basis for the American printing, directly from then secretary of state John Marshall.
Id. at 530, 544.
63. See Letter from R. Smith to Samuel W. Dana (Dec. 26, 1804), reprinted in H.R. REP.
NO. 8-44 (1805), supra note 44; see also Leiner, supra note 19, at 10.
64. 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (1778). Dallas took liberties in recording counsels’ arguments in
several cases before the Supreme Court. See Joyce, supra note 58, at 1304–05. If he did so in
Respublica, that strengthens the conclusion that he embraced its lesson on the law-giving
nature of wartime powers.
65. See Respublica, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 357, 363.
66. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
67. Id. at 31–32.
68. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 78 (1804).
69. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 331 (Béla Kapossy et al., eds., Liberty
Fund 2008) (1758).
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of belonging in fact to the enemy. In a partial war, however, this logic applied
only on a case-by-case basis. Unlike in a general war, whose “extent and
operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of
the law of nations,” Justice Chase had explained in 1800’s Bas v. Tingy,70 an
early Quasi-War case, the “extent and operation” of a partial war were
defined by municipal laws alone.71 In the circumstances of the Quasi-War,
this meant that each seizure had to be inspected to determine how far, as
Justice Marshall had explained in Talbot, the laws of war “actually
appl[ied].”72 If the underlying statute was deemed a war measure, then a
seizure supported by probable cause was justified, even if it turned out to be
mistaken. If, however, the law was a mere domestic measure, neutral nations
could not be expected to take notice, and probable cause would not justify a
mistaken seizure. As Shattuck’s lawyers had reminded the Court in February
1803, “[t]he right of search and seizure is incident only to a state of war,”73
because war measures were the only sort of regulation of which neutral
vessels on the high seas were obliged to take note.
Congress’s piecemeal approach to the Quasi-War consequently left
President Adams on shaky constitutional ground. In May 1798, soon after
Congress had created the Department of the Navy and authorized the
president to procure several vessels to protect American commerce,
Secretary of War James McHenry wrote to Alexander Hamilton seeking
advice. These new vessels would likely encounter French privateers; they
might even need to board a French warship to “terminate a contest.”74
McHenry was anxious to “preserve the Executive from any future accusation,
of having by its orders involved the country in war.”75 What instructions
could he give to these new captains that would “comport with the existing
state of things”?76
Hamilton, a staunch Federalist who would soon be appointed inspector
general of the Army,77 responded that because he had not seen the relevant
statute, he did not know if it had given the president any “new power.”78 If
it had not, the president was left “at the foot of the Constitution” and could
only order captains to repel French privateers encountered within “a marine
league of our coasts.”79 Given the ambiguity of the then existing state of
70. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
71. Id. at 37, 43 (Chase, J.). Similarly, Justice Bushrod Washington explained in Bas that
the partial war was “confined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and
things” and that officers “authorised to commit hostilities . . . can go no farther than to the
extent of their commission.” Id. at 40 (Washington, J.).
72. Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 28.
73. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 70.
74. Letter from James McHenry to Alexander Hamilton (May 12, 1798), reprinted in 21
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 459, 459 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. On Hamilton’s appointment, see RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 558–60
(2004).
78. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 17, 1798), reprinted in 21
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 74, at 461, 461.
79. Id.
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hostilities, anything more would “require[] the sanction of that department
which is to declare and make war”: Congress.80 The best approach,
Hamilton thought, would be for Adams to explain to Congress that under the
current statutory regime, he believed he could only go “so far and no
farther.”81 In “so delicate a case” involving “so important a consequence as
that of War,” Hamilton urged, it was critical that Adams not overstep his
constitutional authority.82 Presenting his dilemma to Congress would win
Adams “credit for frankness and an unwillingness to chicane the
Constitution” and would “return upon Congress the Question in a shape
which cannot be eluded.”83
Hamilton’s careful advice, coupled with McHenry’s focus on avoiding
accusations that the executive had moved the country closer to war,
underscores the executive’s precarious legal position. Where statutes were
clearly part of the nation’s Quasi-War effort, the president could presume the
authority to follow the laws of war, including the use of a probable cause
standard. But where a statute’s war status was murkier, the president was
left “at the foot of the Constitution” and could assume no authority beyond
that which was spelled out by statute.84 Any step taken beyond what was
statutorily authorized risked altering “the existing state of things.”
Congress’s step-by-step approach to authorizing the Quasi-War had created
much constitutional ambiguity and had left the president and his officers to
shoulder the burden.
B. The War Measure Problem
The challenge for Dallas was that none of the three Non-Intercourse Acts
looked much like a war measure. If the Act was not a war measure, then
under the law of nations it could not support the probable cause standard that
Secretary Stoddert had employed when he had instructed naval officers to
seize vessels or cargoes “apparently, as well as really American.”85 True,
the statute had used a probable cause standard in authorizing the seizure of
American ships where there was “reason to suspect” they were engaged in
the prohibited trade.86 But it had said nothing about seizing a vessel where
there was merely a “reason to suspect” it was actually American.87 That
aspect of Stoddert’s orders had been the executive’s gloss alone, and it looked
awfully like a departure from the “existing state of things,” moving the nation
closer to a war footing.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Alexander DeConde describes Adams as “trying to wage a defensive war with
uncertainty as to the extent of presidential powers and without a formal declaration.”
DECONDE, supra note 31, at 89.
85. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
86. Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, § 8, 1 Stat. 7, 10.
87. See id.
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The legislative history did not appear to be in Dallas’s favor. In debate
leading up to the passage of the first Non-Intercourse Act in the spring of
1798, members of the House of Representatives had evinced a number of
justifications for the trade prohibition, none of which seemed particularly
bellicose. Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, an opponent of the bill, had
characterized it as intended to “distress France and the French West Indies as
much as possible,” while Massachusetts’s Samuel Sewall, a supporter, had
offered a number of goals, ranging from preventing privateers from the West
Indies from “depredat[ions on] our commerce upon our coast” to
“withdraw[ing] from our enemies the means of supporting their hostility” to
“induc[ing France] to change her conduct with respect to the United
States.”88 John Rutledge Jr. of South Carolina, another supporter, had
viewed the measure as “a very considerable means of protecting our
seamen.”89 Moreover, when Marshall, in 1801’s Talbot, had surveyed the
various war measures Congress had passed with regard to France in 1798 and
1799 in order to determine how far the laws of war “actually apply to our
situation,”90 he had conspicuously left the Non-Intercourse Acts off his list.
As Shattuck’s lawyers would repeatedly suggest, the trade prohibition
appeared to have been passed not so much to advance war as to prevent it.91
At the 1803 oral argument, Shattuck’s lawyers took the position that the
Non-Intercourse Act had not been a war measure. They reminded the Court
that a nation’s “municipal regulation[s]” were only binding on the nation’s
own citizens and that even then, probable cause did not justify a seizure
unless the municipal law in question made it so.92 They also warned of
severe commercial and diplomatic consequences for holding otherwise. “If
the present circumstances are sufficient to raise a probable cause for the
seizure,” they warned,
and if such probable cause is a justification, it will destroy the trade of the
Danish islands. The inhabitants speak our language, they buy our ships,
&c. It will be highly injurious to the interests of the United States; and this
court will consider what cause of complaint it would furnish to the Danish
nation.93

88. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1860–61 (1798) (statements of Rep. Samuel Sewall and Albert
Gallatin).
89. Id. at 1862 (statement of Rep. John Rutledge Jr.). In asserting the measure’s purpose,
counsel made no mention of the arguments presented in Congress. Professor Farah Peterson’s
recent article on the Marshall Court’s expository practices supplies an intriguing explanation:
in interpreting statutes deemed public rather than private, a category into which the NonIntercourse Act would certainly fall, jurists in the early republic understood legislative history
to be “unallowable.” Farah Peterson, Expounding the Constitution, 130 YALE L.J. 2, 25 (2020)
(quoting Claim of the Representative of Henry Willis, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 752, 753 (1823)).
90. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
91. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 74 (1804) (1803 oral
argument); id. at 108 (1804 oral argument).
92. Id. at 72.
93. Id. at 74.
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For reasons grounded in both precedent and prudence, the Non-Intercourse
Act could not be deemed a part of the war effort. It could thus give “no right
to search a neutral,”94 and Murray owed damages for his trespass.
Dallas had not been at the February 1803 argument in Murray. But when
the case came up for reargument a year later, he vehemently disagreed with
Shattuck’s lawyers’ assertion that the Non-Intercourse Act was not a war
measure. The Non-Intercourse Acts were no “mere municipal laws,”95 he
assured. They were “part of the war measures” Congress had adopted,
“quoad hoc tantamount to a declaration of war.”96 The Non-Intercourse Act,
Dallas was saying, codified the United States’s wartime right to search for
her own citizens trading with the enemy.97 Dallas insisted that Talbot’s
“universal principle” regarding wartime captures applied, and probable cause
would justify the seizure of a vessel liable to capture under the Act.
“Although the act of congress mentions only vessels of the United States,”
he reasoned, “the right to seize and send in must extend to apparent as well
as real American vessels.”98 This was what the president’s instructions had
said, after all. Would the Justices like to hear them?99
No, Justice Chase responded, they would not. He was, he explained,
“always against reading the instructions of the executive; because if they go
no further than the law, they are unnecessary; if they exceed it, they are not
warranted.”100 The instructions had no bearing on the lawfulness of
Murray’s act; they were merely the executive’s interpretation of what the law
allowed. Reading them could only distract from or interfere with the Court’s
own job, which was to determine what the law was. “I think it a bad
practice,” Chase maintained, “and shall always give my voice against it.”101
C. The Dispensing Power Problem
Dallas’s offer to read the president’s instructions, though benign on its
face, had in fact been a loaded question, so much so that Cranch took pains
to capture the Justices’ reactions in a detailed footnote in his official case
report. Cranch’s footnotes in Murray and Talbot suggest that by 1804, there
was an ongoing dispute within the Marshall Court about the admissibility and
relevance of executive orders. In the 1801 arguments in Talbot, one of the
points of disagreement had been whether the Act of July 9, 1798,102 which
authorized the seizure of “armed French vessels on the high seas,” had
94. Id. at 71.
95. Id. at 77.
96. Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “quoad hoc” as: “As to this; with respect to this;
so far as this in particular is concerned.” Quoad Hoc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009). The Non-Intercourse Act, Dallas was saying, was effectively a declaration that the
laws of war applied to the French-American trade made illegal by the act.
97. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 77.
98. Id. at 78.
99. Id. at 78 n.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Ch. 68, 1 Stat. 578.
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actually meant that only French vessels could be seized or whether the phrase
was simply Congress’s ill-advised shorthand for its language in two earlier
wartime measures—“armed vessels sailing under authority, or pretence of
authority, . . . of France” (the wording of an Act of May 28, 1798103) or
“armed vessel[s] sailing under French colours, or acting, or pretending to act,
by, or under the authority of the French republic” (the wording of an Act of
June 25, 1798104).105 Talbot’s lawyer argued that the president had made just
this sort of logical leap, issuing instructions regarding a related measure that
had capaciously interpreted similarly restrictive statutory language. The
lawyer offered to read the president’s instructions to support his
contention,106 but Chase would not have it. “I am against reading the
instructions,” Chase explained, “because I am against bringing the executive
into court on any occasion.”107 Chase’s colleagues were not so rigid—
Justice William Paterson suggested that “[t]he instructions can only be
evidence of the opinion of the executive, which is not binding upon us,” while
Justice Marshall, assuring the Court that the instructions would “have no
influence on my opinion,”108 had “no objection to hearing them”—but the
claimant’s lawyer argued that the instructions were not in the record, and
ultimately the Court did not let them in.109
Chase’s adamancy had deep republican roots.110 Blackstone—whose
Commentaries the Virginia judge St. George Tucker had published with
103. Ch. 78, 1 Stat. 561.
104. Ch. 60, 1 Stat. 572.
105. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 7–8 (1801).
106. Id. at 10. Counsel explained he wanted to read the instructions “because the opinion
of learned men, and men of science, will always have some weight with other learned men.
And the court would consider well the opinion of the executive before they would decide
contrary to it.” Id. at 10 n. Although the historical antecedents of Chevron deference are
beyond this Essay’s scope, this Justices’ exchange, and in particular counsel’s comments,
suggest that the question of whether, for what reasons, and to what extent the judiciary should
defer to executive interpretations of statutes dates back considerably earlier than Edwards’
Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827), the Supreme Court opinion that Chevron
cites as the earliest case holding that “considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.” Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 & n.14 (1984). To my knowledge, no
other scholar has cited the Talbot or Charming Betsy exchanges with regard to their
implications for the roots of Chevron deference, although Henry Monaghan captured the
historical trend accurately when he wrote that “[a]s the nineteenth century wore on, and public
administration became a larger and larger component of the American governmental system,
judicial expressions of deference increased.” Monaghan, supra note 2, at 15. Justice Chase’s
view certainly suggests that not every Justice on the early Marshall Court believed that “[i]n
the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those
who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into
effect, is entitled to very great respect.” Edwards’ Lessee, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 210.
107. Talbot, 6 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 10 n.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Chase’s fierce protection of the judiciary’s power was a consistent theme of his tenure
and an underlying reason for his impeachment, plans for which were being formulated at the
time the Court issued its opinions in Little and Charming Betsy. See generally 1 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 282 (1924); Stephen B. Presser,
Samuel Chase: In Defense of the Rule of Law and Against the Jeffersonians, 62 VAND. L.
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annotation in 1803, only a year before Dallas’s arguments in Charming
Betsy—was explicit that executive orders were only binding to the extent that
they “do not either contradict the old laws or tend to establish new ones.”111
The only source of lawful executive authority, in other words, was statute:
executive orders that contradicted or went beyond legislative acts had no
lawful power either to bind or, in Murray’s and Little’s cases, to exonerate.
Blackstone had illustrated this conception of executive authority by citing a
1766 act of Parliament indemnifying several ministers who had imposed a
corn embargo without parliamentary authorization while Parliament was in
recess, explaining that “a proclamation to lay an embargo in time of peace . . .
being contrary to law . . . the advisers of such a proclamation and all persons
acting under it, found it necessary to be indemnified by a special act of
parliament.”112 The incident, and the lesson it conveyed about the
illegitimacy of what early Americans referred to as the “dispensing power”—
literally, the executive’s power to dispense with the laws in times of duress—
seems to have been well known among Chase’s peers.113 The story thus
sheds light on what Chase may have understood to be the stakes of his
collegial exchanges and on why Cranch may have viewed such judicial backand-forth as worthy of recording in his footnotes.
The outline of the story is as follows. The ministers who had issued the
1766 corn embargo proclamation explained that they had acted to mitigate
grain shortages and quell incipient civil unrest,114 and they defended their
action on the grounds of necessity and the salus populi. But when Parliament
reconvened a month and a half later, it condemned the embargo. Critics
charged the action had not been grounded in statute and that the ministers’
actions were a return to the hated “dispensing power” exercised by King
James II.115 Defenders claimed that the trade ban had been “at worst but a

REV. 349, 352–53 (2019) (describing multiple instances in which Chase articulated a
capacious understanding of the judiciary’s province).
111. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *270.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 538, 564, 573 (1807) (statements of Reps. John
Randolph and Barnabas Bidwell). Early Americans were certainly familiar with the concept
of the “dispensing power.” See, e.g., JOHN BOUVIER, 1 A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 469 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W.
Johnson 3d ed. 1848). This was the first of Bouvier’s editions to include an entry for
“dispensation,” defined as a “relaxation of law for the benefit or advantage of an individual.
In the United States no power exists except in the legislature to dispense with law, and then it
is not so much a dispensation as a change of the law.” Id.; see also Kendall v. United States
ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (asserting that “vesting in the President a
dispensing power” had no basis “in any part of the constitution”). During his impeachment
trial, Justice Chase argued that questions of law were for the court because the jury lacked a
“dispensing power” over the law. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 261 (6th ed. 2005).
114. See generally Philip Lawson, Parliament, The Constitution and Corn: The Embargo
Crisis of 1766, 5 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 17 (1986); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The
Imbecilic Executive, 99 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1380 (2013).
115. See Lawson, supra note 114, at 17.
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forty days’ tyranny”;116 detractors responded that such a position amounted
to “the justification of the legality of [a] power superior to law.”117
Necessity, Lord Mansfield reminded his colleagues in the House of Lords,
could not make law; only Parliament could.118 The solution Mansfield
proposed was a parliamentary act of indemnity “prevent[ing] suits against
the persons concerned in the execution of the order,”119 which would both
protect officers liable to suit and reinforce the critics’ most important point:
that no one was above the law.120 The act that resulted barred suits against
both ministers and those who had acted under their orders. The Journals of
the House of Commons quoted a member’s summation of the case: that
“where the Safety of the People called for an Exertion of a Power contrary to
the written Law of these Kingdoms, such Exertion of Power is excusable only
by [necessity], and justifiable by Act of Parliament.”121
To early Americans, the corn embargo story stood for two things: the
illegitimacy of the dispensing power and the uniqueness of their own
understanding of the rule of law. In Parliament, the act of indemnity had
served as a post hoc justification of the ministers’ actions, immunizing them
from suit and leaving those who had suffered from their unlawful acts
without recourse. But in the United States, Representative Barnabas Bidwell
explained in 1807, “such an act might . . . be considered unconstitutional and
void.”122 Instead, the American government offered compensation after the
fact. The legislature did not immunize the officer against suit but offered
“remuneration for damages incurred” after the courts had first determined
what the officers owed, and then only if the legislature determined that the
officer deserved to be excused from damages. In this way, every injury had
its proper redress, and the rule of law was preserved.123 For a scrupulous
116. Id. at 25 (quoting 1 LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE, LIFE OF WILLIAM EARL OF
SHELBURNE 290 n.2 (2d. rev. ed. 1912)) (reporting the statement of Lord Camden).
117. Letter from The Earl of Suffolk to Mr. Grenville (Nov. 24, 1766), reprinted in 3 THE
GRENVILLE PAPERS 347, 349 (William James Smith ed., London, John Murray 1853).
118. Lawson, supra note 114, at 29.
119. 1 SIR HENRY CAVENDISH, DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 595 (J. Wright ed.,
London, J. L. Cox & Sons 1841).
120. Id. at 32.
121. 18 Nov. 1766, HC Jour. 15 (UK).
122. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 564 (1807) (statement of Rep. Barnabas Bidwell); see also Lucius
Wilmerding Jr., The President and the Law, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 324 n.6, 336 (1952)
(recounting Bidwell’s comments, the corn embargo story, and examples of early Americans’
opposition to the dispensing power). This understanding had changed by 1863, when
Congress passed the Indemnity Act, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863), providing retrospective
defenses to damages actions for officers following presidential orders. See Monaghan, supra
note 13, at 27; see also Prakash, supra note 114, at 1367–68 (noting that today presidents
“stretch and strain constitutional and statutory authority” to argue that their actions are legal,
instead of admitting illegal action and seeking legislative forgiveness).
123. Murray’s and Little’s claims before Congress illustrate this process. See Pfander &
Hunt, supra note 14, at 1900–03 (tracing Murray’s and Little’s relief measures); Wilmerding,
supra note 122, at 324 n.6 (noting Murray’s and Little’s relief). Murray’s petition argued he
had been following orders; the Navy secretary said the seizure had been authorized by military
orders Murray was bound to obey. See H.R. REP. NO. 8-44 (1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 44, at 129, 131. Murray’s relief bill passed in
January 1805, a little more than two months after the House received his memorial. See An
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defender of the rule of law like Chase, the specter of Stuart despotism could
not be ignored, even for sympathetic defendants like George Little and
Alexander Murray.124 Indemnification, even of the most obedient of public
servants, was a job for Congress, not the courts.
D. The Probable Cause Solution: Sir William Scott’s Maritime Law
In Charming Betsy, unlike in Talbot, the executive’s instructions were a
part of the record, something Marshall noted as he overruled Chase’s
objection and let Dallas read the president’s order. Marshall assured Chase
that “[t]he construction, or the effect they are to have, will be the subject of
further consideration.”125 But Chase was not appeased, and Marshall’s
subsequent admission in Little suggests that he may have had good reason to
be concerned. In Little, Marshall acknowledged, he had considered the
possibility that the executive’s instructions might justify Little’s seizure of
The Flying Fish, even though the law did not. In Charming Betsy, a suit
involving a later iteration of the same act and substantially the same
instructions, Marshall may have been considering a similar option: a holding
that probable cause would justify Murray’s seizure of The Charming Betsy
not because Congress had established such a standard but because the
executive had. Chase, I suspect, worried that the Court, in its solicitude for
military officers led astray by their superiors, might disregard the hard-won
lessons of their English forebears, calling into question the fundamental
precept of their new republic: that the United States was a government of
laws, not of men.
But Marshall did not make such a ruling. Instead, he found a way to read
a probable cause standard into the statute without relying on the dubious
proposition that the Non-Intercourse Act had been a war measure. The
questions Marshall asked during the 1803 and 1804 arguments, again
recorded in Cranch’s footnotes, suggest his focus was consistently on finding
an alternative basis for probable cause. In 1803, Marshall had interjected
twice in the argument of Shattuck’s lawyers on the matter of probable cause:
first to point out that an English case, which the lawyers had cited for the
Act for the Relief of Alexander Murray, ch. 12, 6 Stat. 56 (1805); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 985
(1804). Little’s indemnification took longer. The House Committee of Claims recommended
relief in February 1805, see H.R. REP. NO. 8-46 (1805), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 44, at 138, but the House did not vote on relief until
1807. A possible explanation for the delay comes from a House debate a month after Little’s
petition was granted. Representative Bidwell had voted against Little’s relief, he explained,
because he thought that the “[e]xecutive orders, under which [Little] claimed, taken in
connexion with the law, which was referred to in the orders, did not appear to me to warrant
the transaction.” 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 563 (1807) (statement of Rep. Barnabas Bidwell).
Bidwell’s comments suggest that Little’s indemnity took longer because it involved a
straightforward statutory violation; Little should have known the seizure was unlawful.
Presumably, Murray’s case, which had involved only an erroneous judgment as to probable
cause, had presented no such difficulty.
124. See generally Presser, supra note 110 (defending Chase as a zealous proponent of the
rule of law).
125. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 78 n. (1804).
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proposition that probable cause would not justify an erroneous seizure, had
in fact been overturned two years later,126 and second to call attention to an
English decree that the lawyers had failed to cite, a revenue case decided by
the preeminent British admiralty judge, Sir William Scott, that employed a
probable cause standard.127 In 1804, after Shattuck’s lawyer suggested that
the Non-Intercourse Act could not be a war measure because, in a war, no
statute was necessary to make trading with the enemy grounds for
condemnation, Marshall followed up. If the United States and France had
been in a “public general war,” he asked, would probable cause excuse the
taking of a neutral vessel mistakenly believed to be an American vessel
trading with the enemy?128 And Marshall seized on the idea, raised by Dallas
in passing, that “[p]robable cause [was] a thing of maritime jurisdiction.”129
Marshall pressed Dallas for more: “In answer to an inquiry by the Chief
Justice for authorities to support the position that probable cause is always a
justification in maritime cases,” Cranch noted, “Mr. Dallas referred
generally to Brown’s Civil and Admiralty Law, and to the decisions of Sir
Wm. Scott.”130
This reference, vague as it was, appears to have been enough, for when
Marshall issued his opinion on February 22, he employed a probable cause
analysis. “It remains to inquire,” Marshall wrote, having already determined
that The Charming Betsy was not subject to seizure and the recaptors were
not entitled to salvage, “whether there was in this case such probable cause
for sending in the Charming Betsy for adjudication as will justify captain
Murray for having broken up her voyage, and excuse him from the damages
sustained thereby.”131 Whether the Non-Intercourse Act was a war measure,
Marshall did not say; he simply proceeded to evaluate the circumstances that
had existed at the time of The Charming Betsy’s seizure, before concluding
that Captain Murray had lacked probable cause to believe the vessel was
American.132 He owed damages—but not “vindictive or speculative
damages,” Marshall hastened to add. “A public officer intrusted on the high
seas to perform a duty deemed necessary by his country,” he explained, “and
126. Id. at 74 n.
127. Id. at 75. The case cited is The “Sally,” a 1799 opinion by Sir William Scott. See The
“Sally” (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 296, 2 C. Rob. 224 (Eng.); see also Gordan, supra note 62, at
557 n.92 (noting Marshall’s reference to the case and Cranch’s citation of the American
edition of Robinson’s Reports).
128. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 109 n.
129. Id. at 111. Admiralty jurisdiction was commonly thought to involve two separate
headings: the prize courts, which handled all matters involving war, including the seizure of
enemy vessels, and instance courts, which addressed maritime law in peacetime. See Joyce,
supra note 58, at 1315. Admiralty was understood to be part of the law of nations. See Golove
& Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 1003.
130. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 112 n.
131. Id. at 122.
132. James Pfander and Jonathan Hunt mistakenly cite the opinion of District Judge Peters
in concluding that Marshall did not hold that probable cause would justify the seizure. See
Pfander & Hunt, supra note 14, at 1882 n.88. On this basis, they conclude—erroneously, I
believe—that Cranch’s headnote reference to probable cause is misleading. I believe Cranch’s
headnote was correct.

1964

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

executing according to the best of his judgment the orders he has received”
should not be punished for such a mistake.133 Murray ought to compensate
the owners of The Charming Betsy for the damages they sustained as a result
of his decision to libel the ship, but no more. Marshall instructed the circuit
court to establish a commission to calculate damages on this basis and
ordered each party to pay the costs they had incurred on appeal.134
Professor G. Edward White has characterized the prototypical John
Marshall opinion as “grounded . . . [in] the first principles of American
civilization.”135 As White shows, Marshall reasoned syllogistically, moving
through major and minor premises to reach conclusions consonant with these
first principles.136 White’s insight helps us see the first principle implicated
by the probable cause problem in both Charming Betsy and Little: that the
executive could not, to use the words Marshall used in Little, “give a
right.”137 Viewed through this lens, Marshall’s efforts to locate a law-ofnations basis for Stoddert’s order appear as his attempt to determine the
minor premise: whether the executive’s instruction to seize vessels
“apparently as well as really American” had given Captains Murray and
Little any right that Congress had not. Thanks to the maritime decisions of
Sir William Scott, Marshall concluded that it had not: even in peacetime,
neutral vessels could be seized on probable cause, and so the executive’s use
of the standard had not given the nation’s naval captains rights they did not
already possess.
By resolving the probable cause question in Charming Betsy in a way that
avoided a conflict with the law of nations, Marshall also avoided holding that
the Adams administration had altered the “then existing state of things.” This
minor premise—that the probable cause standard was lawfully authorized by
statute—cleared the way for Marshall’s holding in Little, solving a problem
that may well have caused the over-two-year delay between the first oral
arguments in December 1801 and the Court’s 1804 decision. When Marshall
and his brethren first heard argument in Little, it was only seven months after
Judge Peters’s district court decision in Charming Betsy, holding that
whatever probable cause might have existed was irrelevant and that The
Charming Betsy’s seizure had been illegal.138 Presumably, Peters, an
admiralty expert,139 had assumed that the Non-Intercourse Act had not been
a war measure. This meant that by the time the Justices first heard argument
in Little, they were well aware that unless they held that the Act had been a
war measure or found another way to reconcile the executive’s probable
cause standard with the law of nations, there would be no getting around a

133. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 124.
134. Id. at 125–26.
135. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES
AMERICAN JUDGES 11 (3d ed. 2007).
136. Id. at 25.
137. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
138. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 67.
139. See supra note 62 (describing Peters’s admiralty expertise).
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holding that Little’s seizure of The Flying Fish had been unlawful.140 Only
after solving the probable cause problem in Charming Betsy did the Court
return to the question left outstanding in Little: could the executive’s order
excuse an act that would otherwise have been “a plain trespass”?
III. A REREADING OF EXECUTIVE WAR POWER AND OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
IN LITTLE
In his Little opinion, Marshall divides his analysis of the relevance of the
executive order into two parts, following his familiar right-remedy pattern.141
First, he asks whether the president’s order might have been lawful in the
“then existing state of things.”142 If it had been, and if Little had in fact had
probable cause to believe The Flying Fish was truly American, then the
seizure was lawful. Only after concluding that the order had not been lawful
and that the rights of the owners of The Flying Fish had thus been violated
does Marshall turn to the question of the dispensing power. Did the fact that
Little had followed the president’s order in good faith excuse him from
damages for what would otherwise be a tortious act?
A. The President’s Authority to Order Seizures in Little Derives Not from
Inherent Executive Power but from Statute
To determine whether the president’s order had been lawful, Marshall
focuses his first question on the authority Congress had delegated. The
Constitution gave the president the “high duty . . . to ‘take care that the laws
be faithfully executed’” and made him commander in chief.143 Might this
singular role mean the president had had the authority to issue the instructions
in question, despite the fact that his order to seize vessels sailing both to and
from French ports went beyond what the 1799 Non-Intercourse Act had
stipulated? Here’s how Marshall reasons through the question:
It is by no means clear that the president of the United States whose high
duty it is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and who is
commander in chief of the armies and navies of the United States, might
140. Alternatively, the Court could have held that Stoddert’s orders excused the seizure
without determining the probable cause question. But this would have raised the sensitive
dispensing power issue only four months after Chase had objected to “bringing the executive
into court” under any circumstance in Talbot. Moreover, determining whether Stoddert’s
instructions excused Little would likely have returned the Court to the war measure question
since, as Blackstone’s Commentaries suggested, concerns regarding the dispensing power’s
illegitimacy did not apply in wartime. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 111. Until the war
measure question was decided, it probably seemed pointless to again debate the relevance of
executive orders. Tellingly, the Court returned to the dispensing power question in Little only
after the resolution of the probable cause question in Charming Betsy had, by dodging the
Act’s war measure status, made the dispensing power question unavoidable.
141. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 4, at 1515 n.1 (identifying the right-remedy structure of
the first part of Marbury); id. at 1585 n.293 (suggesting that establishing Marbury’s right may
have been a part of Marshall’s strategy to preserve the possible future use of mandamus in the
lower federal courts).
142. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177.
143. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3.

1966

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

not, without any special authority for that purpose, in the then existing state
of things, have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of
the United States, to seize and send into port for adjudication, American
vessels which were forfeited by being engaged in this illicit commerce. But
when it is observed that the . . . first section of the act . . . obviously
contemplates a seizure within the United States; and that the 5th section
gives a special authority to seize on the high seas, and limits that authority
to the seizure of vessels bound or sailing to a French port, the legislature
seems to have prescribed that the manner in which this law shall be carried
into execution, was to exclude a seizure of any vessel not bound to a French
port . . . . [H]owever strong the circumstances might be, which induced
captain Little to suspect the Flying Fish to be an American vessel, they
could not excuse the detention of her, since he would not have been
authorized to detain her had she been really American.144

Today, scholars read this excerpt as addressing the difference between the
president’s constitutional power to issue such an order in the absence of a
statute and the power to do so in the face of explicit congressional
limitation.145 If Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer146 (Steel Seizure)
represents the “bedrock principle” that “except perhaps when acting pursuant
to some ‘specific’ constitutional power . . . the President not only cannot act
contra legem” but “must point to affirmative legislative authorization when
so acting,”147 Little represents the exception: a case where the president acts
pursuant to an inherent power, yet still lacks the power to act contra legem.
On this reading, the case becomes evidence of the president’s reservoir of
implied war power, a precursor to Justice Thomas Clark’s assertion in his
Steel Seizure concurrence that “the Constitution does grant to the President
extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency” and
that “in the absence of . . . action by Congress, the President’s independent
power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation confronting the
nation.”148 Likewise, scholars have argued that Little is a direct antecedent
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,149 in which Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that
“[w]hether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional
authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard

144. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177–78 (emphasis omitted).
145. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 62 (1947); Barron
& Lederman, Lowest Ebb II, supra note 13, at 969; Raoul Berger, War-Making by the
President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 76 n.303 (1972); Geoffrey S. Corn, Presidential War Power:
Do the Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 MIL. L. REV. 180 (1998); Sidak, supra note 13, at
492; Vladeck, supra note 12, at 937. But see SOFAER, supra note 31, at 162 (describing Little
as posing the question “whether a seizure pursuant to an executive instruction was invalid
because the instruction exceeded the power delegated by Congress”).
146. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
147. Monaghan, supra note 13, at 10.
148. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment). For the link
between Clark’s concurrence and Little, see Vladeck, supra note 12, at 937–38.
149. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers,
placed on his powers.”150
But when Justice Marshall wrote in Little about the president’s authority
to act in the face of the Non-Intercourse Act, he was not writing about a
situation in which the president would have had “independent power” to act
“absent congressional authorization.” Such a reading would have run
counter to the lesson of Bas: that, as both Justices Chase and Bushrod
Washington had explained, the extent of a partial war was defined by
statute.151 Moreover, Marshall’s own language suggests his meaning was
more limited—that the baseline of presidential authority he assumes is not an
inherent power to wage war but instead the authority that inheres in the first
responsibility he mentions: the “high duty . . . to ‘take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.’”152 The trade in question was “illicit” not because the
United States was in a general war in which trading with the enemy was
prohibited.153 It was illicit because Congress had declared it so, in the same
piece of legislation in which it had authorized specific ways in which the
president might enforce the ban—in a law, in other words, that the president
was duty bound to faithfully execute. Perhaps, Marshall was saying, that
codification of illegality alone would have empowered the president to issue
the instructions he did, even without section 5’s explicit authorization of
instructions to “the commanders of the public armed ships” to enforce the
ban “on the high sea.”154 But that possibility had been precluded by the fact
that section 5 had clearly limited the law’s application to ships sailing to,
rather than from, French ports.
Marshall’s syllogistic logic helps us to see the major and minor premises
around which this passage is structured. If we assume that the major premise
is that the president cannot “give a right” by ordering unlawful seizures, then
the minor premise is that because the Non-Intercourse Act had implicitly
barred the seizure of vessels sailing from French ports, the executive’s order
had given Captain Little a right to seize vessels where none existed. If, as
the literature assumes, Marshall’s major premise was that the president could
have acted absent congressional prohibition,155 he would not have framed his
150. Vladeck, supra note 12, at 958 (quoting Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23). Vladeck
describes Hamdan as “reaffirm[ing] . . . a straightforward conception of the proper separation
of war powers that is almost as old as the Republic itself, dating back to Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Little v. Barreme.” Id. at 935–36. Other scholars, however, interpret
Hamdan as a case involving the president’s authority to act in the absence of clear statutory
authorization. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security:
Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4–5, 28, 44.
151. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
152. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
153. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 77 (1804) (“By
the general laws of war, a belligerent has a right not only to search for her enemy, but for her
citizens trading with her enemy.”).
154. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 171.
155. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb II, supra note 13, at 965 (assuming
Congress’s prior authorization of force enabled “the President to assert a greater measure of
command authority, rooted in his powers as Commander in Chief, once an armed conflict had
commenced”).
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discussion as an inquiry into “the manner in which this law shall be carried
into execution.”156 Marshall’s language reveals his focus: whether the NonIntercourse Act gave the president the requisite authority. Because he
concluded that it did not, it followed that the executive had, in giving naval
captains a right to seize vessels where Congress had not, exercised a power
possessed only by Congress.
Marshall’s reference to the president’s role as “commander in chief of the
armies and navies of the United States”157 is not to the contrary. As Justice
Robert Jackson noted in Steel Seizure, the commander-in-chief role has long
been cited as support for the president’s “power to do anything, anywhere,
that can be done with an army or navy.”158 But this is not Marshall’s
meaning. Marshall almost certainly intended his invocation of the
president’s commander-in-chief role to be read in connection with his
reference to the “then existing state of things,”159 and thus to the nation’s
state of war or peace as declared by Congress.160 Reading these two phrases
together, we see that Marshall’s reference to the president’s commander-inchief role is neither a nod to a vast reserve of presidential power nor merely
an expression of sympathy for the complex responsibilities borne by wartime
presidents. Instead, it is a deliberate allusion to the lawfulness of the
instructions’ use of a probable cause standard, the conclusion that the Court
had reached five days earlier in Charming Betsy. Because the probable cause
standard did not alter the “then existing state of things” by moving the
country closer to war, Marshall reasons, the president, as commander in
chief, likely could have issued the instructions he did even absent explicit
statutory authorization, had Congress not implicitly prohibited that particular
manner of enforcement.
In ruminating about whether, without explicit legislative direction, the
president could determine how to enforce a municipal measure with theaterof-war implications, Marshall did articulate an expanded vision of the
president’s discretionary authority. But that authority still derived from
statute. Little is not an example of an executive order issued at what
Jackson’s Steel Seizure concurrence called the “lowest ebb” of presidential
power.161 Instead, the additional increment of authority in question is simply
156. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177–78 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 177.
158. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
159. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 177.
160. In explaining the statutory backdrop to Little, Professors David J. Barron and Martin
S. Lederman interpret earlier legislation that had conditionally authorized the raising of forces
as “permit[ing] the President to move the nation to a war footing against France.” Barron &
Lederman, Lowest Ebb II, supra note 13, at 965. This analysis overlooks Congress’s
apparently undisputed consensus that the president could not alter the nation’s war footing,
see supra note 27 and accompanying text, to which I argue Marshall’s use of the term-of-art
phrase “then existing state of things” is a deliberate reference. To read Congress’s conditional
authorization of the raising of forces as permitting the president to alter the nation’s war
footing is, I suggest, an interpretation informed more by present-day assumptions about the
president’s constitutional war powers than by early American understandings of the
president’s power to act in an undeclared war.
161. See generally Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb II, supra note 13.
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the power to execute a statute without explicitly being authorized to do so.
In Steel Seizure’s terms, Marshall’s conjecture is that the president’s action
could have fallen into Jackson’s first category, where the president’s actions
are congressionally authorized, had Congress not implicitly prohibited the
kind of order the president issued.162 From today’s vantage point, where
debates over presidential war powers focus on the constitutionality of
congressional efforts to impose limits on executive action, it is easy to lose
sight of the original terms of debate.163 But as far as Little is concerned,
Jackson’s third category does not exist: the president could not give a right
that Congress had not already given. Far from presupposing the existence of
ample executive discretion in wartime, Little instead exemplifies the
Marshall Court’s understanding that a president’s authority to execute an
undeclared war derived exclusively from statute.
B. Little’s Official Immunity Holding Is Rooted in Separation of Powers
Concerns
Little had no right to seize The Flying Fish. The vessel’s owners had been
wronged; they were owed a remedy. But what if the damages were owed not
by the naval captain who had committed the trespass but by the government
whose orders he had followed? Marshall had already determined that the
president’s orders could not “justify” the trespass, turning an unlawful act
into a lawful seizure. But maybe justifying a trespass was different from
excusing from damages? Here is Marshall’s reasoning:
I confess the first bias of my mind was . . . that though the instructions
of the executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from
damages. I was much inclined to think that . . . . implicit obedience which
military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors . . . ought to justify
the person whose general duty it is to obey them, and . . . . the claim of the
injured party for damages would be against that government from which
the orders proceeded, and would be a proper subject for negotiation. But I
have been convinced that I was mistaken . . . . I acquiesce in [the opinion]
of my brethren, which is, that the instructions cannot change the nature of
the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would
have been a plain trespass.
It becomes, therefore, unnecessary to inquire whether . . . probable
cause . . . would excuse Captain Little from damages for having seized and
sent [The Flying Fish] into port, since had she actually been an American,
the seizure would have been unlawful.164

162. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
163. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 183–84, 288, 301 (1996) (arguing that
the president possesses “plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole organ of the Nation in
foreign relations” to use military force abroad, and that Congress’s power to declare war is
merely the “judicial power” to recognize whether “the nation was [already] in a legal state of
war” for domestic purposes).
164. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 179.
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Initially, Marshall had thought that although the instructions could not give
a right, they might excuse from damages; the passage explains why this
“bias” could not be maintained. The instructions could not “justify” Little’s
actions, turning the ship owners’ claim into one against the U.S. government.
Nor could they exempt Little from damages, Marshall explains, because
either option would effectively legalize a trespass and thus “give a right,” the
very thing Marshall tells us the executive cannot do. Both options, in leaving
the owners of The Flying Fish to seek legislative compensation for the wrong
they had suffered, would sever right from remedy. Marshall’s minor premise
had collapsed: excusing from damages and giving a right were in fact the
very same thing.165
There is also another way to read this passage: as Marshall’s deft
reconciliation of two competing constitutional visions that were then being
contested in courts and legislatures and in discussions “without doors”166
throughout the country. On the one hand was the vision of Federalist
constitutionalism, centered around institutional restraints and the rule of law.
On the other was a Jeffersonian vision premised on legislative supremacy
and the belief that law was “the fist of power and the voice of sovereignty.”167
Marshall, in floating before rejecting the idea that there might be a source of
lawful authority outside of statute, affirmed the core Jeffersonian precept that
statute was the source of law in the American republic.168 But in doing so
through a logical exposition of what it meant to commit a trespass rather than
bald declarations of legislative supremacy, Marshall focused his readers’
attention on a central tenet of the Federalist Constitution: that, as he had
written in Marbury, “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy.”169 In Marbury, Marshall had reasoned the executive could not take
away a right; in Little, he stipulated that the executive could not give one. In
both cases, the executive had caused injury. But in Little, unlike Marbury,
the Court could order the remedy.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the Court let neither Little nor Murray off the hook. But by
reading a probable cause standard into the Non-Intercourse Act, Marshall had
created some space for military officer discretion in the execution of
municipal laws. He had also hinted that the executive’s authority to execute

165. Id.
166. For a powerful exposition of the constitutional thought of the people “out of doors”—
those literally and metaphorically outside the halls of power—see Mary Sarah Bilder, Without
Doors: Native Nations and the Convention, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1707 (2021).
167. REID, supra note 27, at 5.
168. The idea that there might be a source of lawful authority outside of statute also
featured prominently in the contemporaneous debate over whether there was such a thing as a
federal common law of crimes. Marshall no doubt had this debate in mind when he wrote this
passage in 1804. On this debate, see generally Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish:
Federal Authority, Federalism, and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAW
& HIST. REV. 223 (1986).
169. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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the law included discretion over the manner of enforcement, absent
congressional specification. Most important, Marshall had found a law-ofnations basis for Stoddert’s use of a probable cause standard, thereby
avoiding a holding that the Adams administration had brought the country
closer to war while reinforcing the major premise of both opinions: that only
Congress could give a right. Like Marbury, Murray and Little creatively
interpret the bounds of statutory authority in order to avoid an interbranch
conflict over an executive act. Carefully avoiding a clash with the law of
nations, Marshall used both opinions to clear a wider path for the exercise of
executive discretion without undermining the constitutional balance that
placed the lawmaking and warmaking power squarely with Congress.
Recognizing the law-of-nations principle at stake in Charming Betsy and
Little sheds new light on Marshall’s understanding of the relationship
between the executive and Congress in an undeclared war.170 Modern
scholarship tends to see international law as constraining executive power.
Yet in these two cases, the law of nations clarified and expanded executive
authority, allowing the Court to sidestep the vexing questions of the NonIntercourse Acts’ war status and whether the president had, in employing a
probable cause standard, altered the “then existing state of things.” If
Congress had intended to let the president shoulder the burden and risk of
determining what, exactly, the state of things was in the midst of the QuasiWar, then Marshall’s decisions cut short the attempt. By drawing on the law
of nations to define the president’s authority to implement a nonwar measure,
Marshall assigned Congress the responsibility for any resulting change in the
“existing state of things.” So long as the president, in executing a municipal
statute, kept within statutory bounds and the law of nations, his order was to
be understood as authorized by Congress, even if it ended up bringing the
country closer to war. Far from constraining the president’s power, the law
of nations in Little and Charming Betsy was a tool to expand the margins of
executive authority and to foreclose congressional efforts to shift to the
president and his officers the liability for altering the nation’s ambiguous war
footing.
Using the law of nations in this way came at a cost to neutral rights. Prior
to Charming Betsy and Little, officers had been strictly liable for erroneous
seizures of neutral vessels on the high seas outside of wartime. By altering
that standard of proof,171 Marshall weakened the security of neutral shippers.
This fact suggests an intriguing alternative reading of the Charming Betsy
canon. Most modern scholars believe that Marshall’s canonical assertion that
federal statutes “ought never to be construed to violate the laws of nations if
170. Congress has not formally declared war since World War II. Some scholars argue that
today’s nontraditional conflicts, such as the war on terror, should trigger commensurately less
executive branch authority. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb I, supra note 13, at 732
n.124 (quoting David Luban, The Defense of Torture, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 15, 2007, at 37,
38 (reviewing JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR (2006))).
171. For a list of cases citing Charming Betsy and Little for their probable cause standard,
see supra note 20.
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any other possible construction remains” and that they should “never be
construed to violate neutral rights”172 has something to do with the opinion’s
holding that the fact that The Charming Betsy had been built in America
before being sold to a Danish merchant did not subject it to Congress’s ban
on American vessels trading with France.173 This may well be true. But the
statement may also serve as an explanation for why Marshall, a staunch
defender of the legal rights of neutral vessels,174 had employed a standard
that materially diminished those rights. Marshall believed that American
adherence to the law of nations was a central aim of the government’s
constitutional design.175 In Charming Betsy, the protection of neutral rights
and the preservation of American compliance with the law of nations
conflicted. Marshall’s canonical statement can be read as implicitly
acknowledging this trade-off and explaining its rationale, reminding his
readers that ultimately, American fidelity to the law of nations was the surest
way to secure the United States’s neutral rights over the long term.
Likewise, the canon might also be read to refer to the ongoing debate over
the president’s power to act in conditions of statutory ambiguity, where
Congress had failed to adequately define the “existing state of things.” In a
1797 letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison had staked out one position,
arguing that President Adams’s earlier suspension of an order restricting the
arming of merchant vessels engaged in European or West Indian commerce
had effected a “virtual change of the law” and “[u]surp[ed] . . . a legislative
power.” It would “not avail to say that the law of Nations leaves this point
[the lawfulness of arming commercial vessels] undecided, & that every
nation is free to decide it for itself,” Madison contended, because the
regulation was a legislative matter, not an executive one, and thus “comes
expressly within the power to ‘define the law of Nations’ given to Congress
by the Constitution.”176 Whether the nation would exert its power to the
extent permitted by the law of nations, Madison was suggesting, was solely
a legislative decision. This, of course, is the position that Marshall rejects in
Little and Charming Betsy, reasoning instead that in cases of ambiguous
legislative intent, executive discretion could fill in the blanks, bounded only
by what the law of nations permitted. The Charming Betsy canon can be read
to subtly underscore this conclusion, putting Congress on notice that its laws
(and the orders they gave rise to) would henceforth be read to align with the
law of nations wherever possible, including in instances where the
executive’s aggressive interpretation of an unclear statute stretched the limits
of what international law permitted. In the future, the Court was saying,
Congress could no longer rely on ambiguous wording to dodge hard
decisions about military engagement. If it chose not to exercise its power to
172. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
173. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 19, at 486–87; Turley, supra note 19, at 213.
174. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY
56–59 (2012).
175. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 932.
176. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 30; see also SOFAER,
supra note 31, at 143.
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“define the law of Nations,” it effectively authorized the executive to do so,
overseen by a Court that had demonstrated its willingness to capaciously
interpret international law.
Finally, Marshall’s focus on ensuring that the president did not move the
country any closer to war than Congress intended—a focus that existing
scholarship on both Charming Betsy and Little overlooks—reveals a
corollary of the Charming Betsy canon: that interpreting U.S. statutes to
align with international law would do little to secure American compliance
with the law of nations if executive power was understood to extend beyond
the bounds of congressional authorization.177 Recently, Professors Anthony
J. Bellia and Bradford R. Clark described the canon as designed to prevent
judicial encroachment into the foreign affairs power of the political branches
by requiring courts to narrowly construe statutes so as not to “abrogat[e] the
rights of foreign nations” absent a clear statement of intent.178 This
description would almost certainly have been news to Marshall, whose
interpretation of statute in Charming Betsy had been a muscular effort to
avoid holding that the political branches had violated the law of nations and
to police the boundaries between Congress and the executive, not between
the judiciary and the political branches. The canon makes far more sense
when we understand the president’s power to be dependent on statute.
The world of Little and Charming Betsy—a world in which executive
deference to the legislature was a given, presidential power was ancillary and
carried the risk of authoritarian rule, and the law of nations provided a
hermeneutic and doctrinal backdrop not only to the nation’s foreign affairs,
but to its internal governance as well179—is a far cry from the world we live
in today. The assumptions and practices of this world were not specific to
the early republic but instead built on a long, transatlantic tradition of
constitutional thought.180 As Marshall and his colleagues confronted the
question of how to define the terms of legislative power within a national
government of limited powers and jurisdiction—that is, the problem of
Federalist constitutionalism—this backdrop informed their reasoning. Only
by keeping in mind the radically different early modern understanding that
grounded the Marshall Court’s analysis can we fully appreciate Marshall’s
jurisprudential dexterity. And only by attending closely to Marshall’s
language in light of this baseline can we comprehend the full import of two
decisions whose significance has been obscured by two centuries of shifting
understandings of executive power.
177. This might explain why early republic Supreme Court cases treated as inseparable the
issue of “whether a given executive action complied with the laws and usages of war” and the
question of whether congressional authorization of a particular conflict freed “the President to
exercise the full complement of powers that customary international law would sanction in the
case of a war.” Barron & Lederman, Lowest Ebb II, supra note 13, at 954.
178. BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 19, at 83.
179. For more on the Framers’ understanding of the law of nations’ implications for
internal governance, see David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Federalist
Constitution as a Project in International Law, 89 FORDHAM L. REV 1841, 1851–53, 1869–73
(2021).
180. See generally REID, supra note 27.
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Like a Marshall opinion, this Essay has a major premise: that one way to
understand the instantiation of the rule of law in the early republic is through
close doctrinal analysis of the interpretive methods of one of its most
competent practitioners. As with Marbury, attention to Marshall’s careful
reasoning and rhetorical choices in Little and Charming Betsy reveals not just
doctrinal nimbleness. It also reveals the understanding of the rule of law,
with its close connection to the separation of powers, that Marshall saw as
essential to the success of America’s republican experiment. That
particularly American constitutional understanding, grounded in Americans’
fear of arbitrary power and fealty to liberty-protecting “restraints to power
and . . . the rule of law,” is in many ways radically different from the
understanding that governs our contemporary balance of powers.181 How we
moved from Marshall’s world, with its presumption of congressional power
bounded by the rule of law, to our world of executive dominance remains an
urgent legal and historical question.

181. Id. at 24.

